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ABSTRACT
As a critical part of the NASA Constellation Program lunar transportation architecture, the Altair lunar
lander will return humans to the moon and enable a sustained program of lunar exploration. The Altair is
to deliver up to four crew to the surface of the moon and return them to low lunar orbit at the completion of
their mission. Altair will also be used to deliver large cargo elements to the lunar surface, enabling the
buildup of an outpost. The Altair Project initialized its design using a "minimum functionality" approach
that identified critical functionality required to meet a minimum set of Altair requirements. The Altair team
then performed several analysis cycles using risk-informed design to selectively add back components and
functionality to increase the vehicle's safety and reliability. The analysis cycle results were captured in a
reference Altair design. This design was reviewed at the Constellation Lunar Capabilities Concept Review,
a Mission Concept Review, where key driving requirements were confirmed and the Altair Project was
given authorization to began Phase A project formulation. A key objective of Phase A is to revisit the
Altair vehicle configuration, to better optimize it to complete its broad range of crew and cargo delivery
missions. Industry was invited to partner with NASA early in the design to provide their insights regarding
Altair configuration and key engineering challenges. NASA intends to continue to seek industry
involvement in project formulation activities. This paper will update the international coimmunity on the
status of the Altair Project as it addresses the challenges of project formulation, including optinuzing a
vehicle configuration based on the work of the NASA Altair Project team, industry inputs and the plans
going forward in designing the Altair lunar lander.
FULL TEXT
Altair and the Constellation Transportation
Architecture
The Altair lunar lander is an integral component
of NASA's Constellation Program. It is joined
by the Orion crew exploration vehicle, the Ares I
crew launch vehicle and the Ares V heavy-lift
launch vehicle to complete the Constellation
transportation system. Altair's Rndaimental
fiznction is to transport crew and cargo from
lunar orbit to the moon's surface, and to return
crewmembers back to lunar orbit. Altair is also
closely coupled to Constellation's Lunar Surface
Systems, providing transportation and selected
services to lunar surface habitats, rovers, science
experiments and logistics.
Altair perforns 3 distinct, but related, missions.
A "sortie" mission will deliver a crew of 4 and
up to 500 kg of payload to any point on the lunar
surface and support the crew for up to 7 days
prior to returning to low lunar orbit (LLO). An
"outpost" mission will deliver a crew of 4 to the
site of a lunar outpost or other suitable pre-
deployed assets, and remain on the lunar surface
for up to 210 days in long-duration quiescent
mode until the crew returns to LLO. And a
"cargo" mission will autonomously deliver up to
14.5 mt of cargo to the lunar surface.
In crewed modes, Altair's first function is to
perforni Orion-Altair stack attitude control and
Trajectory Correction Maneuvers (TCM) during
trans-lunar coast. It also performs stack Lunar
Orbit Insertion (LOI), stack attitude control in
LLO prior to lunar descent, de-orbit, lunar
landing; lunar ascent, LLO rendezvous with
Orion, and disposal. Cargo landers perform
attitude control and Trajectory Correction
Maneuvers (TCM) during trans-lunar coast, LOI,
de-orbit and autonomous lunar landing. As part
of project formulation activities, a detailed
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operations concept and function derivation has
been performed in order to inform the definition
of Altair system requirements.
The Altair System
Altair currently consists of four major
components: an Ascent Module (AM), a Descent
Module (DM), an Airlock and the Ares V Earth
Departure Stage/Altair Adapter (EDSA). The
AM is built around a crew cabin that serves as
the primary habitable volume for the crew during
at least the descent and ascent phases of the
crewed sortie nui ssion, and provides pressurized
access to the Airlock and Orion. Altair's DM
main function is to deliver hardware (AM with
crew, Airlock, cargo) to the surface of the Moon,
and is built around the descent propulsion
system, landing gear, and structure necessary to
carry loads through all flight phases. The
Airlock module provides ingress/egress access to
the Altair AM in the Sortie mission mode. The
Airlock allows the crew to perform split
operations (e.g. two crew members perform
EVA while two crew members remain in the
Altair) and serves as one of the primary
mechanisms used to control the transport of
lunar dust into the AM. Different combinations
of these modules yield 3 separate configurations
of the lander for crewed sortie missions
(AM+DM+airlock, see Figure 1), crewed outpost
missions (AM+DM) and dedicated cargo
delivery (DM only).
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Figure 1. Altair P905-A configuration
This initial design was chosen with some
thought. Over the past decades, NASA has well
over 100 discrete lander designs that explored
the trade space variables of sta ging, delta-V split,
propellant types, crew size, surface duration,
launch configuration, landing configuration,
launch shroud dimensions, abort capabilities,
crew access, cargo accessibility and offloading,
C.G. control, and a myriad of other, often
competing, design drivers. Based upon this
history of studies, and the specific features of the
overall Constellation architecture, the Altair
Project selected a configuration to begin its risk-
informed design process — a two stage vehicle
using a large, efficient LOX/LH2 stage for LOI
and landing, a small, lightweight ascent stage for
crew habitation and "fli ght deck" functions, and
a separate airlock.
This choice of initial configuration was
necessary to initialize the risk-informed design
process, and has been held constant to enable this
design process to proceed. Freezing a design
early in the process does create a risk that this
initial (likely non-optimal ) design choice
becomes confused with THE ultimate design.
However, an important step that has been
inserted into the Altair design process is to
periodically "step back" and re-evaluate the
vehicle configuration to assess if the team is
pursuing the most optimum design. Having just
completed the initial cycles of risk reduction and
reliability improvements, the next step in the
Altair project will be re-assessing overall vehicle
configuration.
Risk-Informed Design
The Altair project is using a design approach that
is unique to prior NASA human spacecraft
projects'. A typical NASA project first begins
with a set of requirements that describe the
entirety of the functions and performance a
spacecraft must possess, and a vehicle is then
designed to satisfy all of these requirements.
This process results in a design that initially
attempts to meet all requirements equally, and
from which it is difficult to extract capability if
the vehicle is found to exceed mass or cost
limitations. Altair's approach was to first design
a vehicle that meets only a minimum set of
requirements, and then incrementally add
functions and performance back into the design.
This approach allows the decision to accept each
additional requirement to be informed by its
individual impact to cost, performance and risk.
This process was derived in part from NASA
Engineering Safety Center Report NESC PR-06-
108, "Design, Development, Test and Evaluation
(DDT&E) Considerations for Safe and Reliable
Human-Rated Spacecraft Systems
After defining the "minimum functional" vehicle
in the first Lander Design Analysis Cycle
(LDAC-1), subsequent design cycles identified
major risks that affected the safety of the crew
(LDAC-2) ; and the success of the mission
(LDAC-3). By using risks to inform these early
design cycles, the Altair Project was able to
identify the specific performance "cost" of each
increment of crew safety and mission reliability
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that was added to the minimum spacecraft
design. Residual spacecraft risks will continue
to be re-evaluated as subsequent design cycles
assess the performance, cost and risk impacts of
adding  additional vehicle functionality, and other
factors such as manufacturability and
maintainability. Figure 2 illustrates the timeline
of the Lander design cycles.
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Figure 2. Altair Lunar Lander Design Cvcles
Design Analvsis Cycle-Surninaries
The first step of the process is to establish a
"minimum functionality" baseline design. This
requires that the design team scrub the vehicle
requirements back to a small number that
described the essential functions and constraints
of the lander. For the Altair larder these "core"
requirements were to carry 4 crew to the surface
for 7 days with 500 kg of payload, to loiter for
up to 210 days at a polar outpost, to deliver
14,500 kg of dedicated cargo, to package within
the Ares V shroud, to perform the lunar orbit
insertion burn with the Orion spacecraft attached,
to carry an airlock, and to work within the
Constellation FOR-LOR architecture. Key
constraints were control masses of 45,000 kg for
crewed missions and 53,600 kg for cargo
missions.
The Minimum Functional design provided the
baseline from which to identify vehicle risks in
order to mature the design from one that was
essentially "single string" to one that was "safety
enhanced". Risks that contributed most directly
to the Loss of Crew (LOC) would be first
identified, and mitigation options would then be
studied for these risks. Decision processes were
developed for both selecting the LOC risks to be
studied, and evaluating the mitigation options
that would be incorporated into the LDAC-2
design. For this initial risk reduction cycle, the
primary measures would be mass and change to
risk. The outcome of Altair's LOC risk
reduction design cycle was to reduce LOC from
1:6 to 1206 by expending 1300 k g of mass for
more robust components, selective redundancy,
or dissimilar system backups'. This very first
cycle of risk-informed  design brought the lander
design close to the target LOC requirement of
1:250.
The third Altair design cycle focused on Loss of
Mission (LOM) risks in the same way that LOC
risks were addresses in the previous cycle.
Lander reliability risk areas were identified, and
options studied that would increase reliability at
different levels of mass expenditure. The team
also began to incorporate other capabilities, such
as the ability to land on any site on the lunar
globe. This "Global Access" capability will be
"bought back" in the same way that safety and
reliability are re-introduced into the minimum
design - with kno-vvn impact to risk and
performance. The progression of Altair designs
through the desi gn cycles described above is
shown in Table 1.
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LLPO Design Cycle: 	 LDAC-1	 LDAC-1 A	 LDAC-2	 LDAC-3
Sortie Mission
	
A-t Mndule	 5,340 kg	 5,075 kg	 5,300 kg	 61494 kg
Hab Module 1,843 kg 949 kg (Airlock only) 1,053 kg (Airlock only) 1,1/3 Kg (AlrlocK only)
Descent Module 33,976 kg 32,718 kg 33,845 kg 33,483 kg
PMR 3,511 kg 2,858 kg 3,130 kg 2,008 kg
Unallocated 331 kg 3,652 kg 1,671 kg 1,254 kg
Cargo Mission
Descent Module 33,743 kg 34,248 kg 35,656 kg 37,177 kg
PMR 2,304 kg 1,974 kg 2,135 kg 2,003 kg
Unallocated 14,136 ka 17,378 ka 15.808 ka 14,794 k
Crew to Outpost Mission
Ascent Module 5357 kg 5,356 kg 5,525 kg 6,763 kg
Descent Module 33,868 kg 32,684 kg 33,711 kg 33,099 kg
PMR 3,009 kg 2,691 kg 2,940 kg 1,899 kg
Unallocated 2,766 kg 4,269 kg 2,824 kg 2,653 kg
Table 1. Altair Lander Configuration and performance maturation using Risk-Informed Design
Risk-informed design provides early, critical
insight into the overall viability of the end-to-end
architecture, and provides a starting point to
make informed cost/risk trades so that risks can
consciously be bought down. The Altair team
has used the education afforded by risk-informed
design to look at risk reduction in its many forms
and not to blindly apply fault tolerance rules or
preconceived risk reduction solutions. The
process inherently produces risk metrics for each
added capability, and cost analysis can easily be
added to facilitate evaluation of the true cost and
risk changes that accompany each added
capability. Perhaps most importantly, risk-
informed design creates a true "Smart Buyer"
team that inherently understands the balance of
risk drivers and mass performance within the
design.
Industry Lander Studies
In 2008, the Altair office signed contracts with 5
aerospace contractors to conduct parallel studies
of risk-informed lander design. The companies
were given the same set of requirements used by
NASA's in-house Altair team and asked to
independently derive their own `minimum
fiinctionality" lander design, and then to suggest
innovative approaches to improving the safety
and reliability of this design. The contractor
teams identified areas where NASA's initial
design could be further minimized, and where it
Arequired additional performance to achieve only
the essential functions. Each using their own
form of risk-informed design, the contractors
prioritized safety "buyback" candidates,
identifying propulsion, structures and physical
configuration trades as the largest performance
drivers.
The contractor teams were also encouraged to
pursue alternative configurations and innovative
design solutions. The teams created lander
concepts that investigated alternative tank
configurations. alternative propellants, different
mbnuers of engines and engine placement,
alternative ascent module pressure vessels,
different structural systems, and even variants to
the number of landing gear. An example of the
alternative contractor concepts is shown in
Figure 3. In addition to the innovative design
work, the contractors also exhibited a
willingness to work with NASA and with each
other in a collaborative work enviromment where
ideas could be shared and discussed openly. The
industry studies validated NASA's risk-informed
design approach, and provided an excellent
initialization for future design cycles that will
partner NASA and industry.
Figure 3. Examples of Industry lander concepts
Revisiting Configuration Decisions and
Maturing the Design
Risk-informed design works best when the
configuration of the spacecraft is held constant,
so as not to introduce additional variables into
the design. It is also a time consuming process
that may not work for projects with compressed
schedules (the first 3 design analysis cycles took
the Altair team approximately 24 months to
complete). To optimize the risk-based design
effort, the Altair team chose to hold the vehicle
design constant throughout the design cycles,
with a plan to revisit vehicle configuration once
LOC and LOM "buyback" cycles were complete.
With the completion of the risk and reliability
design cycles, the next step is to prioritize the
configuration and maturation studies that would
have the greatest impact on the vehicle design.
Altair considered a list of over 200 potential
configuration/maturation trades, and from that
list chose the following studies as the basis for a
Trade Analysis Cycle (TAC) that was inserted
into the vehicle's development schedule. This
list includes:
• Alternate Descent Module Configuration
• Alternate Ascent Module and Airlock
configuration
• Alternate AM/DM separation concepts and
analyses
•	 Structural Stiffness Design
• Descent Module Tank Residuals
• Human piloting capability maturation
• Ops Con/Ops Timeline maturation
• Spacecraft "safe" configuration for critical
faults
The completion of the Trade Analysis Cycles
will result in a fresh look at the lander design to
determine if the current confi guration is
optimum for the current architecture. Possible
changes may include a reduced number of
descent tanks, alternative descent stage structure,
alternative placement of the ascent module and
airlock, change of the ascent module pressure
vessel shape, and alternative methods of
packaging cargo. It is important for a design to
be revisited on occasion — engineers sometimes
become enamored with our designs and fail to
see large innovative or even subtle alternatives
that may improve the design solution.
Schedulin g regular revisits of the design
configuration into the design process flow offers
the team the opportunity to "step back" and
better optimize the design solution.
Looking
The Altair lunar lander team now possesses the
knowledge of risk and reliability improvements
that can be "bought back" into any lander design.
The Altair team will use this knowledge to
inform the totality of activities that must be
performed during Phase A. Contractors have
validated the risk-informed design process, and
suggested alternative configurations, and other
potential areas of study. From the combination
of these early analysis cycles the Altair office
has assembled a master list of over 200 tasks that
it will undertake to re-assess lander
configuration, mature subsystem designs, and
continue decrementing LOC and LOM risks. At
the same time the office is conducting these
technical studies, it is also validating system
requirements in preparation for a Constellation
Program Systems Requirements Review for the
early lunar missions', as well as maturing its own
Systems Requirements, Interface Requirements,
and other documents in preparation for its own
upcoming Systems Requirements Review.
These are critical Phase A activities. The Altair
Project has sought to streamline NASA
processes and combine the design expertise of
NASA and industry, and will continue to
combine the best of NASA and industry as it
moves from conceptual design into its
preliminary design phase.
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Overview
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♦ Altair Mission Overview
♦ Altair Risk Informed Design Approach
♦ Current Lander Design Overview
♦ The Path Forward
♦ Summary
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Altair Risk Informed Design Approach
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Altair Design Analysis Cycles (LDAC) Focused on Risk
LDAC-1 — Minimum Functional Vehicle
LDAC-1 — Minimum Functional Vehicle with optimized descent module structure
LDAC-2 — Safety/Reliability (crew) Upgraded Vehicle
LDAC-3 — Safety/Reliability (mission) Upgraded Vehicle
Benefits of Risk Informed Design
- QV%l
♦ Provides early, critical insight into the overall viability of the end-
to-end architecture
♦ Provides a starting point to make informed cost/risk trades and
consciously buy down risk
♦ Inherently minimizes interfaces leading to a vehicle that is not over
designed and costly
♦ Facilitates derivation of mandatory design requirements
♦ Facilitates evaluation of what other capabilities cost
♦ Builds and informed Project team
♦ Eliminates mass added due to blind application of fault tolerance
rule
♦ Minimizes amount of redesign required at the end of the design
process due to vehicle exceeding mass budget
Understanding risk drivers enables mass, power,
cost trades to be done in a fully informed manner
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LDAC-1 Starting Point — DRMs and Requirements '
♦ 3 DRMs with Mission Timelines and Functional Allocations
Sortie Mission to South Pole
- 4 Crew / 7 Days on Surface / No support from surface assets
- No restrictions on `when' (accommodating eclipse periods)
Outpost Mission to South Pole
- 4 Crew with Cargo Element (LAT Campaign option 2)
- Outpost provides habitation on surface (down and out)
- 210 Days with surface support (power)
• Cargo Mission to South Pole
- Short duration, large payload
`Hard' Requirements
4 Crew
7 Day Sortie
210 Day Outpost
Airlock (implemented on sortie mission only)
• CxP transportation architecture	 41i^
- 8.4 meter shroud, TLI Loads, Lander performs LOI burn, CEV I RD, etc
• Control Mass
- Total Lander mass at TLI for crewed missions: 45,000 kg
- Total Lander mass at TLI for cargo missions: 53,600 kg
• Delivered payload: 500 kg (sortie DRM), 14,500 kg (cargo DRM)
• Returned payload: 100 kg min/250 kg goal (sortie, outpost mission DRMs)
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LDAC-2: Improving Lander Safety
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♦ Purpose:
• Upgrade the Lander from a minimum functional vehicle to a minimum flyable
vehicle by incorporating safety and reliability design changes that target the
highest risks identified in LDAC-1
♦ Key Questions:
• What data is required to evaluate the proposed design changes intended to
reduce risk?
• What concepts will be incorporated in the DAC-2 Lander?
♦ Analysis Products
• Fault Tree
• Subsystem architecture with A Reliability
• Subsystem operation during degraded modes
• Requirements for Abort Scenario's
• System Performance During Abort Scenario	 Risk Rating
♦ Measures	 L 5
• 0 Risk Rating	 IK 4
• 0 Mass	 E
• 0 Cost	 ; 3
H
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CONSEQUENCE
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Power
10
Improve Reliability of Descent Module Power
System
11
Improve Reliability of Ascent Module Power
System
30 Improved Safety of Main Ascent Module Battery
32 Improve Fuel Cell Safe ty
5 "Lifeboat' Minimum AM Power Requirements
Life Support
12 Increase Reliability of CO2 Scrubbing System
Increase Reliability to Prevent Loss of Breathable
13 Atmosphere
"Lifeboat" minimum breathable atmosphere
17 requirements
Propulsion
8 1 Improve Reliability of Descent Main Engine
Improve Reliability of Descent Reaction Control
9 System
20 Improve Reliability of Ascent MPS and RCS
Improve Reliability of Thrust Vector Control for
25 Descent Main Engine
Improve Reliability of Main Propulsion System
26 Instrumentation
28 Increase Reliability of Ascent Module Main Engine
Prevent freezing of the Hypergol Main and RCS
29 (ascent and descent) Propulsion Systems
1 
Improve Reliability of the Descent Main
34 Propulsion System
LDAC-2 Integrated Risk Analysis Tasks
- QV%l
Task #1	 Task Title
Vehicle Performance/Control
2 Vehicle Dynamic CG Management
Determine Vehicle Performance for Surface
3 Landing
Prevent Ascent Module Re-Contact During
6 Launch
Improve Reliability of the GN&C System with
16 respect to Ascent, Descent, Landing and LLO
Improve Communication System Reliability to be
33 Able to Update the State Vector
Develop Mission Abort Timelines for Descent and
14 Ascent
Structures
Increase reliability of ascent stage/airlock
15 separation system
Improve Landing Gear Deployment, Locking and
23 Load Attenuation Reliability
Increase Reliability of AM/DM Attachment and
24 Separation Mechanisms
Thermal
4	 Improved Thermal System Reliability
Environment
Determine Radiation Environment and Mass
19 Threat for Protection
Determine MMOD Environment and Mass Threat
21 for Protection
AL
Summary LDAC-2 Results:
Probability of Loss of Crew, Mass Available for Payload QV%
1.8E-01
1.6E-01
1.4E-01
12E-01
1.0E-01UOJ
d 8.0E-02
6.0E-02
4.0E-02
2.0E-02
0.0E+00
4000
3500
3000
2500
mY
2000 W
ME
1500
1000
500
0
Sum of System Contributions to LOCI
Mass Available for Payload
Individual Subsystem
Contribution to LOC:
n Events\Hazards
q Life Support
n Thermal
q Propulsion
q Structures and Mechanisms
n Power
q Avionics
-$--Mass Available for Payload
LDAC-1	 LDAC-2
Note: P(LOC) based on simplified models and identified risk
Note: The LDAC-2 vehicle was not a "fully functional" design
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LDAC-2 Lander Design
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LDAC-2 work resulted in
"preliminary design" with
system level products
• Detailed subsystem
schematics based on required
vehicle functionality
• Preliminary component sizing
based on performance
analysis
• MEL based on subsystem-
level details
LDAC-2 design incorporated
LOC mitigation upgrades to
"minimum functional"
design
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LDAC -3 Overview
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♦ Primary objective was to identify loss of mission (LOM) risk
drivers and develop potential changes that improve overall loss of
mission risk
• Some general vehicle design and analysis maturation activity was also
completed
♦ Loss of crew is easily understood, but LOM definition
understanding proved more difficult
♦ LDAC-3 LOM assessment used as a "tool" to support design
development and not as some operational success type of
measure
• In this context, loss of mission was different than mission success
• Loss of mission - Inability to fully complete significant / primary mission
objectives (this is more stringent)
• Mission Success — Measure for how successful a given mission is given
desired vs actual accomplishment (easier to achieve)
♦ 8 mission objectives defined for LDAC-3; violation of any one was
declared LOM
LOM Reduction Buy Back Summary
- QV%l
• Updated cable mass assumptions
• Improved reliability of the power bus by adding circuit bypass and change to
Power	 latching relays
• System resized to 3kW average and 6kW peak power
• Implemented series —parallel redundant bi-prop valves with vehicle supplied
pneumatics for the Ascent Main Engine
Added three-string regulators with pyro ladder on AM RCS to isolate NTO
Propulsion	 during surface stay
• Incorporated autogeneous pressurization to DM system (reduces He need)
Adopted warm / cold He strategy for fuel / oxidizer pressurization
• Added redundant injector heaters and heat pipes for DM RCS
• Updated DM, EDSA, ad RCS struts to composite construction
• Updated Airlock pressure shell design to composite
Structures /	
. Improved fidelity of AM pressure vessel and hatch (to Orion) design
Mechanisms	
. Selected guillotine cutter concept for umbilical separation and matured EDSA
separation system
• Cabin air and suit loop 02 LOM reliability improvement
• Sized potable "fixed charge" and ECLSS bellows water tanks for redundancy
Life Support	 • Added handheld water mist extinguisher for local fire suppression
• Added point of use filters at water supply valves
LOM Reduction Buy Back Summary
- QV%l
• System resized to —6.1 kW, increasing radiators to four
Thermal	 • Implemented sublimator bypass and accumulator with bubble filter for LOM
redundancy
	
C&DH	
Included capacitive discharge pyro firing circuit architecture
i^ Implemented three flight computers (from two)
• Improved fidelity of RF cable mass estimates
	
C&T	 Implemented a single transponder, two software defined radios architecture
• Added optical navigation sensor suite, third IMU, and sixth descent radar
	
GN&C	 antenna for LOM
• Enhanced lidar targets and added running lights to support RPODU operations
• Updated battery charger to a three-channel Li-Ion charger
EVA	 • Added additional contingency equipment
• Added two suit donning stands in Airlock
..,,,-Added vehicle functional checkouts to timeline / ops con baseline
Vehicle System	 • Incorporated basic hardware for lunar surface propellant scavenging
_.'MK_
Current Altair Reference Design Overview
EVA
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Altair Configuration Variants
- Qv%,
C'
Sortie Variant	 Outpost Variant	 Cargo Variant
Descent Module	 Descent Module	 Descent Module
Ascent Module	 Ascent Module	 Cargo on Upper Deck
Airlock
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Altair Basic Vehicle Configuration I
	
QVArchitecture Background
♦ The basic Altair configuration / architecture is subject to multiple design
drivers:
• Cost, schedule, and risk
• General performance, mass, and functionality to reach the moon and return within a
given lunar transportation architecture
• Specific functions and capabilities necessary/desired to achieve mission objectives
including outpost buildup
• Other
♦ Altair efforts to date have focused on areas #1 & #2
♦ Item #3 is more important to vehicle utilization and other constellation
elements, especially surface systems.
♦ Numerous alternate architecture options exist. Many tend to address a
specific concern, capability, feature, or other figure of merit (FOM) from #3
. Achieving these often compromise #1 or #2
. No architecture will satisfy everything
. Project challenge is to avoid investing too much into a configuration that addresses only
a specific concern/capability/FOM and invest in configurations that provide highest
potential to achieve the best balance.
- QV%l
Selected Lessons Learned From Risk-
Informed Design
♦ Full redundancy was usually heaviest, frequently NOT most effective for
improving LOC
• Investigate other means for driving down critical risks — dissimilar redundancy, higher
reliability parts/designs, increased testing, etc.
♦ LOC and LOM are often interrelated, so risk buy-down decisions should
be made on the basis of the best balance between the two
♦ Quantitative risk tool was necessary to inform good design decisions
Always necessary to correlate engineering judgment with tool results
Tool forces team to reconsider
However, cannot rely solely on tool results. Must be able to technically explain
decision.
♦ A risk tool the designers can interact with is a significant aid — improves
tool and design
• e.g., when a result did not correlate with engineering experience, designers could
easily understand model in tool. Sometimes changed model and sometimes did not.
♦ Design for Minimum Risk is the way to go if you are trying to build a smart
design team
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The Path Forward
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♦ Continue Project Formulation (Phase A) activities in a risk
informed manner
• Demonstrate that there is a mission concept that "fits in the box".
• Develop sound bottoms-up requirements for Altair.
— Utilize model based system engineering principles
• Provide data and knowledge for project to project integration.
— Altair team includes representatives from Orion, Ares V, GO, EVA, and LSS.
• Provide data and knowledge for Level 2 integration and architecture trades
• Provide informed data for cost estimation
— Have detailed bottoms-up and top-down cost data to support project planning
• Complete other Project formulation tasks, including
— Upfront system engineering to enable cost, risk, schedule, and requirements
trades
— Technology maturation planning
— Concept of Operations
— End to end testing guidelines
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Summary
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♦ The Altair Project began with the 100+ Lander concepts developed
after ESAS, assessed the alternatives, and began design work.
♦ Altair has taken methodical, risk informed design approach
♦ A real design concept exists
• Current Master Equipment List includes over 4000 items for the sortie
lander
• CAD models contains >3500 parts and subassemblies
• Detailed structural analysis (FEM, Nastran)
• Integrated schematics and individual system schematics, etc.
♦ Current design concept is a POD, not necessarily "the" design
• Too early to downselect to point design
• However, a critical part of the process to-
- Understand design drivers well enough to write good requirements for SRR
— Ensures integration with overall Cx architecture
— Ensures a viable mission concept exists
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